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The economic statistics for 2016 indicate that Ukraine has managed to overcome the toughest 
phase of the economic crisis. For the first time in four years, the Ukrainian economy recorded 
a positive growth rate of around 2%. This is due to the reforms launched in the first months 
following the EuroMaidan and of the implementation of the reconstruction programme un-
der pressure from Western lenders, mainly the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the EU. 
In addition, the favourable situation on global commodity markets and the drop in the price 
of energy resources, as well as good weather conditions which enabled record high grain 
harvest and an all-time-high export of grains, have had a positive impact on the Ukrainian 
economy. Economic growth has accompanied the stabilisation of the macroeconomic situa-
tion, which manifests itself, for example, in halting the slide in the hryvnia in concert with the 
gradual replenishment of foreign exchange reserves, the favourable balancing of budgetary 
revenues and spending (the deficit of around 3% GDP), maintaining the expected level of in-
flation and the improvement of the situation in the banking sector.
These achievements, however, are unimpressive when viewed in the context of the scale of 
the crisis which affected Ukraine in 2014 and 2015, when the cumulative decline in GDP was 
16.5%. Growth was recorded in the key sectors of the economy merely as a result of a low 
reference base. Moreover, the stabilisation of state finances has curbed the drive to carry out 
reforms by the part of the ruling elite and fostered a return to nebulous financial schemes 
in which the highest-ranking politicians are involved. The war in the Donbas, alongside the 
lasting systemic corruption, insufficient deregulation of the economy and the lack of reform 
of the judiciary, contribute to limiting both the inflow of foreign investments and the devel-
opment of the business sector. In 2017, sustaining the rate of economic growth will mainly 
depend on factors beyond Ukraine’s control such as the situation on foreign markets and the 
weather conditions, as well as on the development of the situation in that part of the Donbas 
which is not controlled by Kyiv and on the so-called demarcation line. In an optimistic sce-
nario, which assumes a status quo in the eastern part of the country, continued slow pace of 
reforms and cooperation with the IMF, Ukraine’s macroeconomic situation will remain stable 
and its GDP growth rate will continue to be around 2–3%.
The key macroeconomic data 
The stabilisation of the financial situation and 
a return to growth should be considered the big-
gest successes of the economic policy achieved 
last year. The main reasons behind these suc-
cesses was the relatively stable political situa-
tion in Ukraine, the relative de-escalation of 
military activity in the Donbas, the favourable 
situation on foreign markets and the results 
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of the reforms1. As a consequence, in Q4 2016 
Ukraine’s GDP rose by 1.9% against the previ-
ous three months and by 4.7% when compared 
to Q4 2015. Available data prompts a forecast 
that the total GDP growth rate for 2016 will be 
around 2%2, which is higher than the estimates 
offered by the IMF and the National Bank of 
Ukraine (NBU) in November 2016, standing 
at 1.5% and 1.1% respectively. 
The NBU’s monetary policy should also be con-
sidered a success. It maintained the previously 
set inflation level and the floating exchange rate 
of the hryvnia, which made it possible to halt 
the devaluation trend and to increase foreign 
exchange reserves. As a consequence, in 2016 
the average exchange rate was 25.5 hryvnias 
for one US dollar3, which constitutes an 80% 
reduction in the rate of hryvnia devaluation as 
compared to 2015. At the same time, Ukraine’s 
foreign exchange reserves increased by 17%, 
reaching the level of US$ 15.5 billion at the end 
of 2016, a two-fold increase as compared to 
the end of the crisis year 2014 (US$ 7.5 billion4). 
The restrictive policy of the NBU, which mani-
fested itself, for instance, in maintaining a rel-
atively high base rate (14%) at the end of 2016, 
alongside certain limitations in currency trading 
for banks and exporters, made it possible to re-
duce the inflation rate to 12.4% at the end of 
2016, whereas in 2015 the inflation rate stood 
at 43%. The increase in prices had mainly been 
caused by subsequent stages of the price rises for 
gas, electricity and heating for industrial recipi-
ents, including producers of goods and services. 
1 The aim of this text is not to offer an assessment of the re-
form process in Ukraine, but to present the country’s eco-
nomic situation which largely depends on these reforms. 
It should be remembered, however, that it is not only the 
reforms that determine this situation. More on the reforms 
see W. Konończuk, T. Iwański, T.A. Olszański, P. Żochowski, 
The bumpy road. Difficult reform process in Ukraine, OSW 
Commentary, 3 December 2015, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-12-03/bumpy-
road-difficult-reform-process-ukraine 
2 Data compiled by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine. 
Aggregate and official data for the entire 2016 have not 
been published so far. In 2012, Ukraine’s GDP rose by 
a mere 0.2% and in 2013 the growth rate was 0%.
3 The dynamics of major macroeconomic indicators is pre-
sented in the Appendix.
4 Although as on 1 January 2013 the figure was US$ 
24 billion.
This trend was halted due to various factors, in-
cluding external ones such as the import ban 
imposed by Russia (see below), which contrib-
uted to an increase in the supply of foodstuffs 
on the Ukrainian domestic market and, as a re-
sult, to a drop in their prices. At the same time 
Ukraine failed to attract major foreign invest-
ments. There were several positive initiatives 
including the US$ 75 million investment carried 
out in the Lviv oblast by the Japanese company 
Fujikura5, but this was an exception. In 2016, 
the total value of foreign direct investment 
amounted to US$ 4.4 billion although65% of 
this was in the form of investment in the fi-
nance and insurance sector (US$ 2.8 billion), 
including a staggering US$ 1.6 billion trans-
ferred by Russian banks as additional capital for 
their Ukrainian subsidiaries6. 
Stabilisation of the macroeconomic situation 
probably would not have been possible with-
out Ukraine’s close cooperation with the IMF 
under the so-called extended fund facility7. 
In line with its provisions, subsequent instal-
ments of the US$ 17.5 billion loan extended to 
Ukraine are conditional upon various govern-
ment bodies – mainly the Ministry of Finance 
and the NBU – implementing further reforms 
and changes in the monetary and financial 
policy. At the same time, the IMF loans and 
other loans extended to Ukraine (for example 
by the EU and Japan) alongside loan guaran-
5 http://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2016/09/30/607225/
6 Cyprus was ranked second (US$ 427 million), which most 
frequently means that Ukrainian capital is reinvested by 
off-shore companies registered in Cyprus; https://www.
epravda.com.ua/news/2017/03/1/622136/
7 For more see R. Sadowski, Nowy program pomocy MFW 
dla Ukrainy, Analizy OSW, 12 February 2015, https://
www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2015-02-12/
nowy-program-pomocy-mfw-dla-ukrainy
Stabilisation of the macroeconomic 
situation probably would not have been 
possible without Ukraine’s close coop-
eration with the International Monetary 
Fund.
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tees (offered by the USA) have contributed to 
an increase in Ukraine’s debt. According to 
data from the Ministry of Finance, at the end of 
2016 the state’s debt and the debt guaranteed 
by the state stood at US$ 71 billion (1.9 trillion 
hryvnias), accounting for 82% of Ukraine’s GDP8. 
Ukraine’s US$ 3 billion debt to Russia, result-
ing from loans taken out by former president 
Viktor Yanukovych back in December 2013, 
continues to be a problem. Moscow did not 
consent to restructuring of this debt and Kyiv 
refused to repay it on time. In this situation, 
Moscow brought the case to the High Court 
in London. In March 2017, the court issued 
a verdict which was unfavourable to Ukraine, al-
though it granted Kyiv the right to appeal. Ukraine 
will most likely lodge such an appeal because 
it is interested in prolonging the proceedings. 
Good news from the sectors 
of metallurgy and agriculture
In 2016, the 2.4 % increase in industrial out-
put, as compared to 2015, was one of the most 
encouraging results recorded by the Ukrainian 
economy. It was particularly evident in the met-
allurgical sector (+6%), which enabled Ukraine 
to be ranked tenth on the list of the world’s 
largest producers of steel (24.2 million ton-
nes)9. The production increase was possible 
due to a rise in the scrap metal export tariff 
from 10% to 30%, which impacted the avail-
ability of domestic scrap metal and contrib-
uted to an expansion of the range of goods 
produced by metallurgical conglomerates. 
At the same time, maintaining the upward 
trend in the metallurgical sector is uncertain 
due to the ‘social’ blockade of traffic between 
the areas of the Donbas that remain outside 
Kyiv’s control and the rest of Ukraine, which has 
been ongoing since the end of January 2017. 
The blockade is resulting in a shortage of coal 
which, in its enriched form, is a key material 
8 http://espreso.tv/news/2017/02/03/derzhborg_ukrayiny_
za_rik_zris_do_71_mlrd
9 https://economics.unian.ua/industry/1743667-ukraji-
na-za-pidsumkami-roku-zberegla-10-te-mistse-v-svito-
vomu-reytingu-virobnikiv-stali-infografika.html 
used in the production of steel. It has already 
caused a halt in the operation of the Yenakiieve 
and Alchevsk metallurgical conglomerates 
and reduction of production in the Metinvest 
and Industrialnyi Soyuz Donbasa holdings. 
In February 2017, the losses were estimated at 
around US$ 160 million per month (US$ 2 bil-
lion annually, or 5% of Ukraine’s total exports)10. 
In early March, the energy company DTEK an-
nounced that it had halted the operation of 
its major coal mines located in the part of the 
Donbas not controlled by Kyiv11. The Ukrainian 
leadership’s decision of 15 March, involving the 
suspension of freight traffic across the demar-
cation line12, will likely aggravate the problems 
affecting the Ukrainian metallurgical sector 
and undermine the prospects of coal mines and 
other heavy industry plants located in areas not 
controlled by Kyiv, which were taken over by 
the so-called separatists in early March13.
Due to favourable weather conditions, Ukrain-
ian agriculture was enormously successful 
in 2016. The grain harvest was a record high – 
66 million tonnes (up by 9% versus 2015), involv-
ing mainly corn (28 million tonnes) and wheat 
(26 million tonnes)14. The bumper harvest ena-
bled record high exports. Over the last so-called 
marketing year (July 2015 – June 2016), Ukraini-
an producers sold 39 million tonnes of grains to 
their foreign contractors, up by 13% compared 
10 http://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2017/03/2/622214/ 
11 http://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2017/03/10/622495/
12 T. A. Olszański, Poroshenko authorises a blockade of the 
Donbas, OSW Analyses, 22 March 2017, https://www.
osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2017-03-22/poro-
shenko-authorises-a-blockade-donbas
13 No detailed information is available, which de facto 
means that these companies have been taken over by 
the so-called separatists, http://www.pravda.com.ua/
news/2017/03/1/7136784/
14 http://minagro.gov.ua/uk/node/22985
The blockade of transport routes in the 
Donbas has led to a reduction in the pro-
duction of steel, an important source of 
export revenues.
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to the preceding season. Positive results record-
ed by Ukrainian agro-holdings15 facilitated their 
return to foreign financial markets. In January 
2017, for the first time since the outbreak of 
the war in eastern Ukraine, Kernel16, the lead-
ing producer of sunflower oil, sold Eurobonds 
worth US$ 0.5 billion (with an annual yield of 
8.8%). Despite these developments, the agri-
cultural sector is still struggling with problems. 
The most significant ones include the modest 
state support for farmers (in the 2017 budget 
4 billion hryvnias have been earmarked for sub-
sidies and 1.5 billion hryvnias for investments – 
in total around US$ 200 million17), limited lend-
ing activity by Ukrainian banks and high costs 
of loans, as well as limited access to Ukrainian 
fertilisers and the need to import more expen-
sive ones from Russia. In the nitrogen fertilisers 
segment, Russian products have a market share 
above 25% and the government is making 
preparations to introduce anti-dumping tariffs 
on these products. In 2017, agricultural compa-
nies will no longer be eligible for exemptions in 
VAT repayment and will be subject to general 
taxation rules, which in turn will increase their 
operational costs. Moreover, in autumn 2016 
President Poroshenko signed a law extend-
ing the moratorium on trade in arable land18 
to 2017, which will limit the inflow of invest-
ment (according to the deputy minister of ag-
15 For more on Ukraine’s agriculture see A. Sarna, 
The transformation of agriculture in Ukraine: From 
collective farms to agroholdings, OSW Commentary, 
7 February 2014, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publik-
acje/osw-commentary/2014-02-07/transformation-agri-
culture-ukraine-collective-farms-to
16 Kernel is listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange, in 2016 
it reported net profit of US$ 225 million. 
17 https://agropolit.com/spetsproekty/217-agrarniy-byud-
jet-2017-vidjatisya-i-stati-efektivnishim-chi-pomerti
18 In practice this means that unrestricted trade in arable 
land will be suspended at least until 1 January 2018. 
riculture the losses resulting from the morato-
rium are estimated at US$ 3.3 billion annually, 
or more than 3.5% of Ukraine’s GDP19). 
Foreign trade: imports up, 
exports down
Exports are of key importance for the Ukraini-
an economy because they generate up to half 
of the country’s GDP. In 2016, as compared to 
2015, a negligible decrease in trade turnover 
was recorded, with exports shrinking by 4% 
and imports rising by 3.7%20. The total value 
of Ukraine’s trade exchange (goods and servic-
es) was almost US$ 90 billion and the positive 
trade balance was a mere US$ 337 million (US$ 
3.8 billion in 2015). The usual driving forces be-
hind Ukrainian exports are products from the 
agro-industrial sector, including foodstuffs, and 
metallurgical products. In 2016, the sale of ag-
ricultural produce to foreign recipients rose by 
4.5% to US$ 15.5 billion and increased its share 
in Ukraine’s total export of goods to 42%21. 
Asian countries remain the principal recipients of 
Ukrainian agricultural produce (46%) and Africa, 
Egypt in particular, is becoming an increasingly 
popular destination (15.7%). In 2016, according 
to information from the Ukrainian government, 
Ukraine was one of the top three suppliers of 
agricultural produce to the EU22. Metallurgy, for 
its part, is the second most important sector of 
the economy from the point of view of Ukraine’s 
exports (accounting for 23% of total exports) 
and one of the main sources of foreign curren-
cy. Increased production alongside the rise in 
the price of steel on global markets have made 
it possible to reduce the rate of decline in sales 
of metallurgical products to foreign recipients 
(to -12% in 2016 versus -38% in 2015) and the 
falling currency revenues related to it.
19 http://forbes.net.ua/ua/opinions/1426443-perspek-
tivi-2017-chogo-chekati-ukrayinskomu-apk-v-no -
vomu-roci
20 Data in this section quoted after Ukrstat unless other-
wise indicated.
21 Data compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture, http://mi-
nagro.gov.ua/uk/node/23131
22 h t t p : / / w w w . e u r o i n t e g r a t i o n . c o m . u a /
news/2017/03/7/7062659/
2016 saw a record high grain harvest 
(66 million tonnes) and the Ukrainian 
economy has increased its dependence 
on agriculture.
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The main cause for the drop in trade turnover has 
been the limitation of trade with Russia. In 2016, 
the imports of goods from this country fell by 
another 31% and exports declined by 25.6%23. 
Despite this, Russia continues to be Ukraine’s 
main trade partner (9.9% of its exports and 13% 
of imports). The reason behind this decrease 
has been Russia’s military aggression in eastern 
Ukraine and tense political relations, which trig-
gered the escalation of the trade war launched 
by Moscow back in August 2013. In 2016, the 
Kremlin expanded its embargo on the import 
of products from the Ukrainian agro-industri-
al sector and imposed restrictions, practically 
tantamount to a ban, on the transit of Ukrain-
ian goods via Russia, which affected Ukraine’s 
exports to Central Asia and China. Moreover, 
the Kremlin has unilaterally terminated the free 
trade agreement within the CIS24. In 2016, the 
conflict with Russia and the temporary introduc-
tion on 1 January 2016 of the provisions of the 
Deep and comprehensive free trade agreement 
with the EU (DCFTA) resulted in a rise in Ukrain-
ian exports to the EU (of 3.7%) and in the EU’s 
share in the structure of recipients of Ukrainian 
goods and services (37%).
Prospects
No major acceleration of Ukraine’s economic 
growth should be expected in 2017. The reforms 
carried out so far have not been sufficiently 
deep to improve Ukraine’s rating in major rank-
ings such as Fitch, S&P and Doing Business, and 
thereby to make the Ukrainian economy more 
attractive to foreign investors. This is one of 
the reasons why in 2016 only 1% (190 million 
hryvnias out of the planned 17 billion25) of the 
23 A decrease in trade exchange with Russia has continued 
since 2012 but it accelerated considerably over the last 
three years. 
24 Fore more on this see W. Górecki, cooperation 
T. Iwański, Pakiet rosyjskich sankcji wobec Ukrainy, Ana-
lizy OSW, 13 January 2016, https://www.osw.waw.pl/pl/
publikacje/analizy/2016-01-13/pakiet-rosyjskich-sankc-
ji-wobec-ukrainy
25 https://www.epravda.com.ua/news/2017/01/23/618490/
privatisation plans were implemented. The sale 
of the most significant assets was postponed 
for 2017, although no breakthrough in privati-
sation should be expected due to foreign inves-
tors’ continued reluctance to invest in Ukraine 
and to insufficient capital on the part of do-
mestic investors. 
As a consequence, the minor growth of the 
Ukrainian economy in 2017 will result from the 
expected increase in domestic consumption, 
stemming from a two-fold rise in the minimum 
wage to 3200 hryvnias (US$ 110) and from the 
increased export of agricultural produce whose 
share in total exports will likely continue to 
rise. Ukraine’s economic growth will strongly 
depend on external factors such as the situa-
tion on foreign markets, continued cooperation 
with the IMF and other lenders and on the sta-
bilisation of the military situation in the eastern 
part of the country. 
For a real boost in Ukraine’s economic devel-
opment to be possible, the pace of reforms 
would need to be increased by implementing 
the laws already in place and adopting further 
laws, such as those involving the reform of the 
judiciary and the public prosecutor’s office. 
In addition, continued deregulation of the 
economy would be necessary alongside effec-
tive measures to combat corruption. Recent 
months have seen a rapid decline in the pace 
of reforms in Ukraine. Paradoxically, this main-
ly results from the relative stabilisation of the 
economic situation and the increased tension 
in domestic politics. Ukrainian politicians are in-
creasingly focused on two upcoming elections 
– the presidential and parliamentary elections 
in 2019, which negatively impacts their eager-
ness to implement reforms.
Although the trade turnover with Russia 
has diminished, Russia remains Ukraine’s 
main trade partner.
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APPENDIX
Ukraine’s basic macroeconomic indicators
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1. Foreign exchange reserves, in US$ billions 2. Inflation rate, %
Source: National Bank of Ukraine
3. Base rate, %
Source: National Bank of Ukraine
Source: Ukrstat
4. Foreign trade balance, in US$ billions 
Source: Ukrstat
5. Ukraine in international rankings (2016)
